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NEUROSCIENCE CHANGES MORE THAN 
YOU CAN THINK 
Paul S. Davies† 
Peter A. Alces†† 
 
Abstract 
In this Essay, we consider the contribution of a startling new book, Law 
& Neuroscience (L&N), by Owen Jones, Jeffrey Schall, and Francis Shen.  It is 
a law school course book (a genre not often the focus of a scholarly review 
essay) that supports fundamental inquiry into the relationship between 
emerging neuroscientific insights and doctrinal conceptions in the law.  We 
believe that the book shifts the paradigm and so may profoundly affect the 
course of normative evaluation of law.  In this Essay, we trace and evaluate 
the “argument” of the book and suggest ways in which its contribution to the 
normative analysis of law may impact students and legal scholars for years to 
come.  We believe that L&N is that rare work that will, quite literally, change 
the way people think. 
The book’s power rests, securely, on two premises: (1) legal doctrine 
derives mainly from our folk psychological intuitions (based on our inferences 
about others’ beliefs, desires, and intentions) concerning human agency and, 
in particular, our capacities for practical reason; and (2) progress in the 
sciences of the mind, including neuroscience, casts grave doubts on folk 
intuitions at the core of our understanding of human agency.  It is folk 
psychology that gives way to an understanding informed by neuroscience, 
compelling revision of our notions of responsibility embodied in contracts, 
torts, and criminal law. 
Part I describes the dynamic balance and pedagogical power that the 
format of L&N achieves.  That dynamic and power is illustrated in the contrast 
between the neurological reductionism endorsed by Francis Crick and 
skepticism expressed by Stephen Morse concerning the relevance of 
neuroscience to legal doctrine.  On Crick’s view, if our folk psychological 
intuitions come into conflict with known neurological facts, it is folk intuitions 
that must go.  On Morse’s view, by contrast, there are, either in principle or 
merely in fact, no discoveries in neuroscience that threaten our folk view of 
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ourselves.  In their judicious selection of theoretical perspectives and case 
studies, the editors of L&N sustain the Crick-Morse dichotomy across a wide 
range of substantive legal issues. 
We complete our analysis in Part II by taking a stand of our own—we 
show the very real challenges to law presented by the Crick-Morse dichotomy.  
With Crick and others, we argue that the former authority of our folk intuitions 
must be ceded to conflicting findings in science.  In defense, we show that 
recent discoveries from cognitive neuroscience integrate with discoveries in 
affective neuroscience, and, from those premises, we defend two claims: 
(1) many human actions—those we intuitively judge to be evaluable in moral 
and legal terms—are, as a matter of fact, causally influenced by affective 
processes about which we cannot reason, precisely because those processes do 
not rise to conscious awareness; and (2) some information about our affective 
processes can rise to conscious awareness, but, even when that occurs, the 
actual causes of our actions are liable to misinterpretation.  We conclude that, 
if either (1) or (2) is correct, assumptions at the core of our folk view of human 
agency cannot be sustained.  The shift in paradigm is profound indeed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Folk psychology”1 is the basis of legal doctrine, and probably 
deontological normative theory, too.  Much of law and deontological moral 
theory understand human agency in terms of beliefs, desires, and intentions 
held by human actors, the subjects and objects of legal doctrine.2  But what if 
 
 1.  “A term for people intuitively understanding and talking about human psychology.  Humans have 
an immediate understanding of themselves and other people.”  René Rosfort, Folk Psychology, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCES AND RELIGIONS (Anne L.C. Runehov et al. eds., 2013); see also Ian Ravenscroft, 
Folk Psychology as a Theory, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Aug. 16, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ 
folkpsych-theory/ (providing an overview of folk psychology). 
 2.  This is not to say, of course, that significant portions of the law do not reflect consequentialist 
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folk psychology (not a pejorative term) is wrong, or just incomplete?  
Newtonian physics, by way of useful analogy, can get you through the day, 
unless your day involves space travel or nuclear energy.  If you do want to 
travel in space or cause a nuclear reaction, you need relativity.3  Maybe there is 
something more you would need to understand human agency if and when folk 
psychology is insufficiently acute, where the broad strokes of belief, desire, 
and intent fail.  Neuroscience may provide that something more, and cognitive 
psychology,4 certainly an aspect of neuroscience, may be to folk psychology 
what Einstein’s relativity is to Newtonian physics.  Law based on folk 
psychology and its often-implicit deontology5 might be based on incomplete 
conceptions of human agency.  That would be significant, and problematic for 
legal doctrine and normative theories of law based on such incomplete 
conceptions. 
Were there means to reconceive, to conceptualize more accurately, the 
nature of human agency—what, in fact, it means to be human—then those 
means would shift the paradigm,6 profoundly.  We believe that law and legal 
philosophy are at something of a precipice (more profound than a mere 
crossroads), and that the challenge neuroscientific insights present to law may 
well lead to changes in our understanding of morality as morality is reflected in 
legal doctrine.  The best evidence of that paradigm shift is found in a course 
book, not a monograph or treatise.  Professors Owen Jones, Jeffrey Schall, and 
Francis Shen have assembled teaching materials that change the way we think 
of the relationship between law and legal actors.7  They do not offer answers to 
the crucial fundamental questions; they do much more: they formulate the 
crucial questions in terms that resonate with the normative foundations of law; 
they pose questions the law cannot (yet) answer, but surely must.  Before their 
important contribution to legal pedagogy, the questions were not asked and so 
the consequences of their answers were latent. 
In this Essay, written by a law professor and a philosophy professor, we 
describe and appraise Law & Neuroscience (L&N).8  While we discuss the 
scope of the book and its strengths as well as occasional weaknesses, our focus 
is on its significance as well as the significance of the fact that the paradigm 
 
intuitions.  Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 22, 2015), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/. 
 3.  Markus Pössel, From E=mc2 to the Atomic Bomb, EINSTEIN ONLINE (2010), http://www.einstein-
online.info/spotlights/atombombe. 
 4.  Cognitive psychology is the study of the brain and “higher mental processes such as attention, 
language use, memory, perception, problem solving, and thinking.”  Richard J. Gerrig & Philip G. Zimbardo, 
Glossary of Psychological Terms, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/research/action/glossary.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2017). 
 5.  Deontological ethics or deontology is the normative ethical position that judges the morality of an 
action based on the action’s adherence to a rule or rules.  Rosalind Hursthouse & Glen Pettigrove, Virtue 
Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Dec. 8, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/. 
 6.  Thomas Kuhn explains the nature of “paradigm shifts” in the scientific world, where new 
discoveries both change the mode of thinking of those engaged in science as well as leave unanswered 
questions for future scientists to study.  See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 
10 (3d ed. 1996). 
 7.  OWEN D. JONES, JEFFREY D. SCHALL & FRANCIS X. SHEN, LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE  (2014) 
[hereinafter L&N]. 
 8.  Id. 
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shift effected by this book will be accomplished, largely, in the classroom.  It is 
in the classroom where (candor compels us to acknowledge) most legal 
scholars and philosophers will have more impact than they will through any 
number of articles or books they write for colleagues in their fields.  Our 
conclusion: Jones, Schall, and Shen will make law students and their 
professors uncomfortable.  Perfect. 
In the parts of the Essay that follow, we consider the effectiveness of the 
book in a separate law school course on Law & Neuroscience9 and in the 
Philosophy curriculum.10  We take account of the ways in which the book 
challenges the conceptual/empirical distinction (too often misunderstood)11: 
are the limitations of the science a function of current (and remediable) 
empirical shortcomings of the science or are those limitations a function of the 
science’s failure to capture something about human agency that the science just 
could not capture?  We also touch, briefly, on what the book may reveal about 
the impact of neuroscience on the so-called “naturalistic fallacy,” the way 
“ought” may or may not be a reflection of the “is.”12  And, finally, we explore 
the significance of neuroscience for conceptions of responsibility, in terms that 
resonate with the normative calculus in the tort, contract, and criminal law 
doctrine. 
II. THE BOOK’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF LAW 
The law must make moral sense, and that is a simple matter of efficacy 
wholly irrespective of whether legal doctrine vindicates something like natural 
law (even assuming there is such a thing).  One could understand law as the 
social form of a normative elaboration: social interaction (the reason for and 
context of law) is built on emotional reaction, heuristics that guide 
interpersonal behavior.13  Visceral emotional reactions to inappropriate 
violence, for example, are reified as moral imperatives (“thou shalt not kill”) 
and ultimately codified in legal doctrine, which is able to distinguish murder 
from other forms of homicide in order to vindicate normative conclusions that 
promote the corporate welfare.14  That is a stark diagram of the dynamic, but it 
distills the calculus into its essential constituents.15  That schematic also 
 
 9.  Professor Alces has taught the Law & Neuroscience course as a law school course, once with a 
preliminary draft of L&N and more recently with the first edition of L&N. 
 10.  Professor Davies specializes in the philosophy of biology and psychology.  For the past several 
years he has been teaching and publishing on the implications of the sciences of the mind for theories of 
responsibility.  L&N is likely to serve as a valuable resource in his advanced seminars. 
 11.  Though we are not yet willing to allow that there is a worthwhile distinction between the conceptual 
and the empirical.  See generally PAUL S. DAVIES, SUBJECTS OF THE WORLD: DARWIN’S RHETORIC AND THE 
STUDY OF AGENCY IN NATURE (2009). 
 12.  L&N, supra note 7. 
 13.  For more on the notion that social interactions and law are based on heuristics and basic emotions, 
see Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral 
Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 830 (2001) and JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD 
PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION (2013). 
 14.  SARAH BROMBERG, THE EVOLUTION OF ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO CYBERNETIC ETHICS (2d ed. 
1999). 
 15.  See PETER A. ALCES, A THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS AND MORAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 276 (2011) (“In order to reach a conclusion about the normative proclivities of legal doctrine, it 
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emphasizes the mechanics of the calculus.  There is not (or at least there need 
not be) anything “real” in some divine or existential sense about the genesis of 
human morality: it describes the rules, the expectations that accommodate 
coexistence and thriving in a cooperative context.  We are social, and the 
continuum from emotional reaction to moral conclusion to legal doctrine is the 
“is” that determines our sense of “ought.”  For present purposes, though, it is 
sufficient to recognize that evolutionary basis of law and morality, the morality 
that matters to, that determines, law. 
Emotional reactions, the precursors of morality, are the product of 
predisposition, if not strictly “hard wired.”16  While there is some room for 
cultural differentiation, for the most part, to be human is to admire what 
humans admire (e.g., maternal love and devotion) and to abhor what humans 
find loathsome (e.g., sexual abuse of children).  It is not difficult to see, 
drawing on those parenthetical examples, the very direct connection between 
individual and group thriving, on the one hand, and our “natural” emotional 
reactions, on the other.  This is essentially similar to the basis of sexual 
attraction: the same characteristics that make someone attractive to another are 
the characteristics that generally confirm genetic fitness.17  But poems are not 
written about genetic fitness, as such. 
Once we understand the constituents of emotional reaction, we can 
appreciate that morality may be empirical, that it may reduce to certain 
fundamental properties.  And we are, concomitantly, nothing more than the 
sum of such fundamental properties, which, in turn, are nothing more (and 
nothing less) than electrical, chemical, and structural incidents of our brains.  
There is, at the end of the day, nothing about us that cannot be captured in such 
empirical terms; there is no whole that is greater than the sum of its parts, no 
matter how pleasant or reassuring it might be to imagine otherwise.  But once 
we understand human agency—and so human emotion, morality, and law—in 
those empirical terms, what have we said about the law and about philosophy 
that would make sense of responsibility within such a conception of human 
agency?  Jones, Schall, and Shen help us approach that question. 
A. Reconceptualizing Legal Doctrine 
Neuroscience, at least the impact of neuroscience on conceptions of 
human agency that matter to law, is something of a recent revelation: surely we 
have known for thousands of years that we have brains, and that it is our brains 
that define who we are as individuals and as a species.  But it is only within the 
last fifteen years or so that we have come to consider the impact that 
 
is worthwhile (perhaps indispensable) to begin with a better understanding of moral reasoning . . . .  Legal 
doctrine is, after all, a way for humans to order normative relations.  The only source for such legal morality 
would be the human normative sense, and there is no obvious argument in favor of basing legal morality on 
anything other than human morality, which is a product of our moral psychology.”). 
 16.  Id. at 278, 288. 
 17.  See Steven W. Gangestad, Sexual Selection and Physical Attractiveness, 4 HUMAN NATURE 205, 
206–08 (1993) (suggesting that physical attractiveness and sexual selection are linked due to “good genes” and 
one’s “investment potential” in a mate). 
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neuroscientific insights might have on legal doctrine.18  And it was, not 
entirely coincidentally, about fifteen years ago that functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) of the brain became more generally available19 on a 
scale that accommodates the type of neuroscientific research that can reveal the 
mind at work in ways that matter to the tort, contract, and criminal law (as well 
as all of the other areas of law that are elaborations of the fundamental 
premises formulated in those three primary doctrinal areas). 
It is one thing to incorporate a “reasonable person” standard into the tort 
law; it is wholly another to understand the neural constituents of that standard 
in terms that may be revealed in fMRI images, images that depict the 
perceptual and cognitive incidents of the decisions that lead to the behavior 
that we might decide is negligent.  The same is certainly true of the consent 
criterion in contract law: once we appreciate what it means, at the neural level, 
to conclude that there is the type of consent that will support the imposition of 
contract liability—and can quite literally see the formation of consent20 (as 
well as the impact of deception)—we recognize that the concept is a normative 
conclusion rather than a simple empirical observation.  In essence, we enforce 
what some normative conception determines we should enforce, and cast that 
conclusion in terms of “consent.”  So deconstructed, the reality of consent, as 
anything more than a normative conclusion designed to serve a normative 
purpose, seems elusive. 
Now, insofar as neuroscience investigates human agency at the neuronal 
level, and endeavors to find the reasons for behavior in the operation and 
cooperation of neural systems, its application to the inquiries particularly 
pertinent to the criminal law would seem most obvious.  It is already well 
accepted that mental deficiency may mitigate, or obviate entirely, criminal 
liability for some anti-social acts.  The insanity defense21 is commonplace in 
 
 18.  There is a history of neuroscience being used as evidence in the courtroom.  The defense for John 
Hinckley, the man who attempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan, introduced a CAT scan in an 
attempt to show his shrunken brain tissue, which can be an indicator of schizophrenia.  Stuart Taylor, Jr., CAT 
Scans Said to Show Shrunken Hinckley Brain, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/ 
02/us/cat-scans-said-to-show-shrunken-hinckley-brain.html; see also United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 
(D.C. Cir. 1982).  In People v. Weinstein, a PET scan was admitted to show that the defendant, charged with 
murder, had a cyst in his arachnoid membrane.  591 N.Y.S.2d 715, 716–17 (Sup. Ct. 1992).  The defense 
offered that as an explanation for Weinstein’s violence.  Id.  Recent developments such as fMRI have opened 
more doors for neuroscientific evidence because the scans measure changes and patterns in brain activity.  See, 
e.g., Emily R. Murphy, No Lie MRI Being Offered as Evidence in Court, STAN. L. SCH.: L. & BIOSCIS. BLOG 
(Mar. 14, 2009), http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/lawandbiosciences/2009/03/14/no-lie-mri-being-offered-as-
evidence-in-court/ (reporting on child protection hearing in California where defense is planning on 
introducing fMRI test findings as evidence of parent telling truth, arguing that “the fMRI-based lie detection 
(or ‘truth verification’) technology is accurate and generally accepted within the relevant scientific 
community . . . .”). 
 19.  See Hannah Devlin et al., Introduction to FMRI, NUFFIELD DEP’T CLINICAL NEUROSCIS., 
https://www.ndcn.ox.ac.uk/divisions/fmrib/what-is-fmri/introduction-to-fmri (last visited Feb. 18, 2017) 
(explaining the history of fMRI and its growing use in the early 1990s). 
 20.  See, e.g., id. (explaining activation maps in fMRIs); Nat’l Inst. Biomedical Imaging & 
Bioengineering, Imaging Technique Can See You Think, SCIENCEDAILY (Nov. 30, 2016), 
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/11/161130144008.htm (describing new fast fMRI technique that 
can be used to “see” human thought). 
 21.  The M’Naghten Rule, applied to determine if a defendant should be found not guilty by reason of 
insanity, asks first whether the defendant knew what he was doing, and then whether the defendant knew what 
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popular depictions of the criminal law, and the U.S. Supreme Court has taken 
into account neuroscientific insights in reaching important conclusions about 
the culpability and punishment of adolescents and others whose intellectual 
capacity is distinguishable from that attributed to “normal, healthy adults.”22  
The imposition of criminal liability requires the coincidence of mens rea and 
actus reus.  Mental defect or deficiency may undermine the conclusion that a 
defendant had the state of mind, the mens rea, necessary to impose criminal 
liability.23 
There are at least three aspects of state of mind (neural state) that may be 
pertinent to the mental calculus determinative in the criminal law: (1) ability to 
(a) distinguish right from wrong24 and (b) control one’s actions;25 (2) ability to 
appreciate the connection between the act committed and the punishment 
thereof;26 and (3) psychopathy, the neural state evidenced by the inability to 
empathize, to feel the pain and fear of others (including one’s victims).27 
Neuroscience can discover patterns of brain activity and structure that are 
consistent with aberrational behavior.28  In fact, that can be done at an 
impressive level of acuity; in theory, that may be done at the level of a single 
neuron.29  When and whether the available imaging techniques will achieve the 
 
he was doing was wrong.  M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (HL).  In contrast, the Model Penal 
Code section concerning insanity provides: “[A] defendant is not responsible for criminal conduct where (s)he, 
as a result of mental disease or defect, did not possess ‘substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality 
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.’”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.03 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1962). 
 22.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617–18 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that if adolescents 
are mature enough to decide whether to have an abortion, then they are likely mature enough to be tried for the 
death penalty); see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74–75 (2010) (holding that juveniles cannot be 
sentenced to life without parole for non-homicide crimes). 
 23.  See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding that Eighth Amendment prohibits State 
from imposing death penalty on those who are insane). 
 24.  See, e.g., Delling v. Idaho, 133 S. Ct. 504, 504 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The law has long 
recognized that criminal punishment is not appropriate for those who, by reason of insanity, cannot tell right 
from wrong.”). 
 25.  See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 598 (identifying “lack of control” as one reason “juveniles [may] be 
forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment”). 
 26.  See, e.g., Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 934–35 (2007) (“Gross delusions stemming from a 
severe mental disorder may put an awareness of a link between a crime and its punishment in a context so far 
removed from reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose.”). 
 27.  It is estimated that 10%–15% of criminal offenders are psychopaths, compared to only 1% of the 
general population. See Robert Hare, Focus on Psychopathy, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. (July 2012), 
http://leb.fbi.gov/2012/july/focus-on-psychopathy; see also Paul Babiak et al., Psychopathy: An Important 
Forensic Concept for the 21st Century, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. (July 2012), http://leb.fbi.gov/2012/ 
july/psychopathy-an-important-forensic-concept-for-the-21st-century (noting that more men are psychopaths 
than women).  Psychopaths are characterized by both interpersonal traits, such as manipulativeness, lack of 
empathy, and failure to accept responsibility or feel guilt; and affective traits, such as a lack of behavior 
control, proneness to boredom, and shallow emotional affect.  Kent A. Kiehl, A Cognitive Neuroscience 
Perspective on Psychopathy: Evidence for Paralimbic System Dysfunction, 142 PSYCHIATRY RES. 107, 128 
(2006). 
 28.  See Kate Kelland, Study Finds Psychopaths Have Distinct Brain Structure, REUTERS (May 7, 2012, 
4:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/07/us-brains-psychopaths-idUSBRE8460ZQ20120507 
(detailing study that compared brain scans of criminals and found “the strongest evidence yet that psychopaths 
have structural abnormalities in their brains”). 
 29.  One such study observed the stimulation of single neurons in a live monkey as it performed goal-
oriented hand movements.  Giuseppe Di Pellegrino et al., Understanding Motor Events: A Neurophysiological 
Study, 91 EXPERIMENTAL BRAIN RES. 176 (1992); see also THOMAS Z. RAMSØY, INTRODUCTION TO 
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level of acuity that will identify a particular behavioral anomaly with a 
particular chemical, electrical, or structural state is a subject of both conjecture 
and opinion.30  If it is just a matter of time and research before that would be 
realized, then the limitations of the current science are empirical, and advances 
in measuring techniques and devices may overcome empirical limitations.  But 
if there will still be a gap, some cause that will certainly evade measurement 
no matter how sensitive our measurement techniques and devices, then the 
insurmountable limitation would be “conceptual” rather than empirical: there 
would be a gap there for which the science could not account, and there will, in 
turn, be a limit to the impact neuroscience can have on law, or any theory of 
human agency, for that matter.31 
And if there is a causal factor for which neuroscience cannot account, 
then there will be a dualism that materialism cannot deny.  Now, that dualism 
need not be the substance dualism of Descartes,32 but it would be a dualism 
that would insulate fundamental conceptions of human agency—and in turn, 
responsibility—from the empirical analysis and perspective of neuroscience.33  
To date, the critiques of neuroscience, as it would be applied to law, have 
posited such a dualism, even while denying doing so.  Critics of the 
neuroscientific perspective draw distinctions between the brain and the “human 
being,”34 or the brain and “the person,”35 or, perhaps most typically, between 
the brain and the mind.36  But, for materialists, for those most favorably 
impressed by the neuroscientific perspective, there is no difference between the 
brain and the human being (or the person), and mind is just a manifestation of 
brain as fist is a manifestation of hand.37 
So, how to address that fundamental disagreement in terms pertinent to 
law? 
 
NEUROMARKETING AND CONSUMER NEUROSCIENCE 66–67 (2014) (“[T]here are single cells within your own 
head that respond ONLY to one particular item[.]  About a decade ago, researchers at CalTech recorded the 
activity of single neurons . . . while epilepsy surgery patients watched images of people, objects and places.  
Here, they found one cell that responded only to Jennifer Aniston!  Another cell only responded to images of 
the Sydney Opera House, and yet another cell responded only to images of actress Hale [sic] Berry.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 30.  See generally MICHAEL S. PARDO & DENNIS PATTERSON, MINDS, BRAINS, AND LAW: THE 
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 22 (2013) (detailing neuroscience imaging). 
 31.  See id. (positing distinction between “conceptual” and “empirical”).  But see DAVIES, supra note 11 
(casting doubt on efficacy of such distinction). 
 32.  Substance dualism is the notion that there are “two kinds of substance: matter, of which the 
essential property is that it is spatially extended; and mind, of which the essential property is that it thinks.”  
Howard Robinson, Dualism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 29, 2016), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ 
dualism/. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  M.R. BENNETT & P.M.S. HACKER, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NEUROSCIENCE 3 (2003) 
(“[Neuroscience’s] discoveries in no way affect the conceptual truth that these powers and their exercise in 
perception, thought and feeling are attributes of human beings, not of their parts—in particular, not of their 
brains.”). 
 35.  PARDO & PATTERSON, supra note 30, at 22  (“[P]ersons are not their brains . . . .”). 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Robinson, supra note 32. 
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B. Presenting the Tension 
Law & Neuroscience begins with that fundamental quandary by 
juxtaposing two brief quotes, one from Francis Crick, winner of the Nobel 
Prize in Medicine or Physiology,38 and one from Stephen Morse, Professor of 
Law and of Medicine at the University of Pennsylvania.39  First Crick: 
“You,” your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your 
ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact 
no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their 
associated molecules.  Who you are is nothing but a pack of 
neurons . . . .  [A]lthough we appear to have free will, in fact, our 
choices have already been predetermined for us and we cannot 
change that.40 
Crick’s “astonishing hypothesis” is the materialistic, neuroscientific 
conclusion: human agents are the sum of mechanical processes that are perhaps 
more complex than any other machine so far developed (or of which we are 
aware) but essentially no different from other systems.  Professor Robert 
Sapolsky has likened the human agent to a car41: just as you would not 
“punish” your car when it does not start one cold morning by “sentencing” it to 
the garage until it “learns its lesson,” it would be inefficacious to rely on 
insubstantial and dualistic conceptions of human agency—perhaps informed 
by folk psychological focus on beliefs, desires, and intent—to punish rather 
than to discover the physical source of the problem, and all problems of human 
behavior have a physical (neuronal) source that could only respond to a 
physical (ultimately neuronal) solution.42 
Juxtaposed with that perspective is the caution of Professor Stephen 
Morse, perhaps the highest-profile critic of the neuroscientific materialistic 
perspective: 
Neuroscience has the potential to make internal contributions to 
legal doctrine and practice if the relation is properly understood.  For 
now, however, such contributions are modest at best and 
 
 38.  The prize was awarded to Francis Crick jointly with Maurice Wilkins and James Watson “for their 
discoveries concerning the molecular structure of nucleic acids and its significance for information transfer in 
living material.”  The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 1962, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize. 
org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1962/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2017). 
 39.  L&N, supra note 7, at 3. 
 40.  FRANCIS CRICK, THE ASTONISHING HYPOTHESIS: THE SCIENTIFIC SEARCH FOR THE SOUL 3 (1994). 
 41.  L&N, supra note 7, at 18. 
 42.  See Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, 359 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1787, 1794 (2004) (“Whereas it is true that, at a logical 
extreme, a neurobiological framework may indeed eliminate blame, it does not eliminate the need for forceful 
intervention in the face of violence or antisocial behaviour.  To understand is not to forgive or to do nothing; 
whereas you do not ponder whether to forgive a car that, because of problems with its brakes, has injured 
someone, you nevertheless protect society from it.”); Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(Mar. 11, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/11/magazine/11Neurolaw.t.html (quoting Robert Sapolsky: 
“You can have a horrendously damaged brain where someone knows the difference between right and wrong 
but nonetheless can’t control their behavior . . . .  At that point, you’re dealing with a broken machine, and 
concepts like punishment and evil and sin become utterly irrelevant.  Does that mean the person should be 
dumped back on the street?  Absolutely not.  You have a car with the brakes not working, and it shouldn’t be 
allowed to be near anyone it can hurt.”). 
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neuroscience poses no genuine, radical challenges to concepts of 
personhood, responsibility, and competence.43 
That assessment of the neuroscientific “state of the art,” as it were, is 
somewhat obscure: is Professor Morse saying that the science should not 
inform legal conclusions or that the science, in its current state, cannot, at least 
effectively, inform legal conclusions?  As a matter of fact, it would be 
inaccurate to conclude that neuroscientific insights cannot impact the law:  
there are already several examples of courts using neuroscience to determine, 
at least in part, the results of important issues pertinent to the tort,44 contract,45 
and criminal law.46  Now, it may be that courts, and the attorneys who frame 
the issues for them, have been precipitous in their consideration of 
neuroscientific evidence.  And, indeed, there is some dubious science that even 
the most enthusiastic supporter of the neuroscientific perspective would not 
endorse.47  But those who practice, particularly those who litigate today and for 
the foreseeable future, ignore the potential incorporation of neuroscientific 
insights into legal argument at their peril. 
If, however, Professor Morse is suggesting a more broad conclusion, 
something more akin to the dualistic assertion that there is a crucial something 
pertinent to normative (including legal) analyses that the materialism of 
neuroscience simply cannot comprehend (this construction of his position 
seems more in line with his assertions elsewhere),48 then he is not just 
observing that the folk psychological perspective animates the law but that the 
folk perspective must be the animating principle that makes sense of legal 
doctrine.49  And it is not much of a leap, if a move at all, from the conclusion 
 
 43.  Stephen J. Morse, Lost in Translation?: An Essay on Law and Neuroscience, in 13 LAW & 
NEUROSCI.: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 2010, at 529, 562 (Michael Freeman ed., 2011). 
 44.  L&N illuminates areas where neuroscience has informed tort law’s distinction of “mental” and 
“bodily” injury.  See L&N, supra note 7, at 354–61. 
 45.  L&N highlights the use of neuroimaging to discern whether an individual had capacity to contract.  
See id. at 10–12 (reproducing the case of Van Middlesworth v. Century Bank & Trust Co., No. 215512, 2000 
WL 33421451 (Mich. Ct. App. May 5, 2000)). 
 46.  L&N treats at some length the Supreme Court’s use of neuroscience to evaluate the criminal law’s 
treatment of juveniles.  See L&N, supra note 7, at 72–100 (discussing Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. 
Florida); id. at 569–78 (discussing Miller v. Alabama); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) 
(“[A]s the scientific and sociological studies respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, ‘[a] lack of 
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are 
more understandable among the young.  These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions 
and decisions.’” (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 
(2010) (“[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between 
juvenile and adult minds.”); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 n.5 (2012) (“The evidence presented to 
us in these cases indicates that the science and social science supporting Roper’s and Graham’s conclusions 
have become even stronger.”). 
 47.  Francis X. Shen & Owen D. Jones, Brain Scans as Evidence: Truths, Proofs, Lies, and Lessons, 62 
MERCER L. REV. 861, 883 (2011) (discussing Cephos Corporation’s brain-based lie detection technology: “As 
United States v. Semrau illustrates in the brain-based lie detection context, attempts to use brain scans in legal 
contexts will often precede the full appropriateness of doing so.”). 
 48.  As Professor Morse has stated, “Brains don’t kill people.  People kill people.” Stuart Fox, Laws 
Might Change as the Science of Violence Is Explained, LIVE SCI. (June 07, 2010, 4:44 AM), 
http://www.livescience.com/6535-laws-change-science-violence-explained.html. 
 49.  Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to 
Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 2–4 (2008).  Professor Morse writes: 
  Roughly speaking, the law implicitly adopts the folk-psychological model of the person, which 
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that folk psychology is the foundation of legal doctrine to the conclusion that 
deontological principles are, at least quite often, the foundation of legal 
doctrine.  That is, folk psychology, as a normative theory of law, depends on 
the same principles as does deontological philosophy.  So if folk psychology 
fails to accurately capture the nature of human agency, so does deontology, 
and the two together would fail as accurate, as complete and sufficiently acute, 
conceptions of the relationship between human agents and legal doctrine. 
The Crick-Morse dichotomy, then, is crucial.  It presents the fundamental 
tension that matters throughout the neuroscience-law dialectic.  Presentation of 
that persistent dialectic must be consistently considerate of what is at stake: the 
normative foundation of law and human agency.  Demonstrating the dynamic 
in an accessible and compelling way would seem daunting.  There is only so 
much that can be done with the teaching materials normally incorporated in 
law school course books.  But here is where L&N shifts the paradigm: the 
book presents the dynamic by maintaining the tension through the balanced 
organization and presentation of accessible materials that are unsettling, and 
unsettling in a pedagogically compelling way.  You may not finish the book 
with great confidence in either Crick’s enthusiasm (or resignation?) or Morse’s 
skepticism, but professors and students who work through the book will never 
think about the law, or human agency (for that matter), the same way again.  
The book does what great teaching does: it changes the student, profoundly.  
That sweeping conclusion requires elaboration. 
C. Through a Glass, Darkly 
Maintaining focus on that fundamental normative tension in the course of 
a survey of the areas of the law that might be affected by its resolution is 
difficult and challenging for both professor and student.  Organization can do a 
great deal to juxtapose the (at least ostensibly) conflicting perspectives, and the 
organization of L&N is strong.  The first portion of the book, in particular, 
presents the big normative question(s) and invites critical analysis of the 
important distinctions and discontinuities. 
 
explains behavior in terms of desires, beliefs and intentions.  If practical reason plays no role in 
explaining our behavior, as some neuroscientists and others claim, current responsibility doctrines 
and practices would have to be radically altered or jettisoned altogether.  I suggest, however, that the 
conceptual and scientific support for this argument is thin at present and that there is good ground to 
believe that our conception of persons as agents is unlikely to disappear.  Consequently, legal and 
moral doctrines that depend on agentic personhood are secure—at least for now. 
   . . . . 
   Consciousness and action are central to the law’s view of the person.  The capacity for intentional 
activity or stillness—the capacity for agency—is a central aspect of personhood and is integral to 
what it means to be a responsible person.  We act because we intend.  Responsibility judgments 
depend on the mental states that produce and accompany bodily movement and stillness.  This is 
how we think about ourselves, and this is the concept of the person that morality and law both reflect. 
   The law’s view of the person is thus the so-called “folk-psychological” model: a view of the 
person as a conscious (and potentially self-conscious) creature capable of practical reason, an agent 
who forms and acts on intentions that are the product of the person’s desires and beliefs.  We are the 
sort of creatures that can act for and respond to reasons.  The law properly treats persons generally as 
intentional creatures and not as mechanical forces of nature. 
Id. at 2–4. 
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1. Neuroscience and the Individual 
The editors use a compelling context—the murder of a spouse—to depict 
the promise and limitations of neuroscience as it relates to individual brain 
anomalies.50  That is, how should the law respond when an injury or disease of 
the brain is apparently or actually the cause of an individual’s aberrational 
behavior?  Brain conditions that affect a particular individual rather than all 
similarly situated members of a class (usually determined by reference to age 
or gender, or some combination of the two) raise different issues (or similar 
issues differently) from brain conditions that cut across all members of some 
demographic group. 
The challenge here in both settings is doctrinal as well as evidentiary.  
Doctrinally, it is important to appreciate how the extant law can accommodate 
analysis that takes normative account of behavior caused by a brain condition’s 
impact on a particular individual’s behavior.  The evidentiary question is 
different: given the doctrine, how do advances in neuroscience confirm a 
normatively (even morally) significant connection between a brain state or 
condition and behavior (or state of mind) that the law regulates?  Would 
neuroscientific insights compel a change in doctrine or just an adjustment of 
relevance and probity in the court’s evidentiary determinations?  It is one thing 
to admit an fMRI scan to establish that the defendant was capable or incapable 
of a particular brain state; it is wholly another to conclude that such a brain 
state is normatively significant, that it should or should not be determinative of 
culpability or liability. 
Chapter 2 of L&N describes the pertinence of neuroscientific evidence at 
the individual level: did the cyst on the defendant’s brain cause him to murder 
his wife and then try to cover it up as a suicide?51  The question here is not 
whether those with brain lesions generally should be excused, whether they 
should avoid the consequences of their actions; the question presented is 
whether Mr. Weinstein52 may avoid criminal liability on account of the 
arachnoid cyst covering a substantial portion of his frontal lobe.53  Now, we 
could generalize from whatever conclusion we reach on those facts—all of 
those with such brain anomalies have, at least, reduced criminal 
responsibility—but that does not change the focus of this portion of the 
materials: the question here is what the law should do with brain anomalies 
that do not affect all members of a demographic group. 
 
 50.  L&N, supra note 7, at 14. 
 51.  Id. at 41–67. 
 52.  Chapter 2 of L&N centers around discussions of Herbert Weinstein’s murder trial.  Id.  Weinstein 
was accused of strangling his wife and throwing her from their high-rise apartment in an attempt to make the 
death look like a suicide.  People v. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d 715, 717 (Sup. Ct. 1992). 
 53.  Arachnoid cysts consist of fluid-filled sacs located between the brain and the arachnoid membrane.  
Arachnoid Cysts Information Page, NAT’L INST. NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS & STROKE, https://www.ninds. 
nih.gov/Disorders/All-Disorders/Arachnoid-Cysts-Information-Page (last visited Feb. 18, 2017).  The cysts 
can appear visually ominous on a brain scan, obscuring large areas of the brain.  The cysts, however, may 
remain asymptomatic.  Id.  The danger in Mr. Weinstein’s case was that the cyst was putting pressure on 
Weinstein’s left frontal lobe, an area controlling the brain’s executive functions.  Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 
722. 
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The problems with such individual brain anomalies are largely problems 
of proof of causation, as the book well presents.  Certainly the cyst looked 
quite dramatic on the fMRI scan, but how can we have any confidence that the 
cyst necessarily caused the behavior that the criminal law doctrine is designed 
to police?  Indeed, unless we fortuitously had a scan of Mr. Weinstein’s brain 
at a time when he was acting perfectly normally, we could not connect the dots 
from the problematic scan to the problematic behavior.  That, though, is an 
empirical question; and once we recognize it as such, we are assuming the 
pertinence of it to the responsibility calculus: if we knew for a fact that Mr. 
Weinstein would not have killed his wife but for the cyst, then would we still 
impose criminal liability on him?  If we did, what would we be punishing, Mr. 
Weinstein or the cyst (which could, perhaps, be excised)?  Presented that way, 
the responsibility question in the context of individual brain anomalies 
challenges, or provides the basis to challenge, extant doctrine.  It also 
juxtaposes the Crick and Morse view: if we are just the sum of neuronal 
activity, and we can change that activity by adjusting the neurons, then there is 
no other work for normative responsibility to do.  But if, instead, per Morse, 
“brains do not kill people; people kill people,”54 then Mr. Weinstein has no 
defense.  We could pay no attention to his claim that “my brain made me do 
it.”55 
2. Neuroscience and the Group 
While the use of neuroscientific insights has already been pertinent to 
individual cases, as the neural function of particular individuals is concerned, 
perhaps the more significant impact to date has been with regard to groups: 
specifically adolescents.  There is no question that the “teen years” (and 
perhaps stretching well into the twenties) are a challenging time as the brain 
develops the social sense that will, in the normal course, accommodate 
successful adult interpersonal interactions.56  But a good deal is going on 
within the developing brain: such as myelination of axons57 and pruning of 
neuronal connections.58  Teenage brains have more neural connections than 
adult brains59: but that is not a good thing.  There are indeed too many 
 
 54.  See Morse, supra note 49. 
 55.  Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 717. 
 56.  See Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, The Mysterious Workings of the Adolescent Brain, TED (June 2012), 
http://www.ted.com/talks/sarah_jayne_blakemore_the_mysterious_workings_of_the_adolescent_brain 
(discussing brain development and adolescent behavior). 
 57.  Myelination involves insulation of the portion of the neuron that transmits neural (electrical) 
messages.  See Daniel Kantor et al., Myelin, MEDLINEPLUS, https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/002261.htm 
(last updated June 1, 2015) (“Myelin is an insulating layer, or sheath that forms around nerves, including those 
in the brain and spinal cord.  It is made up of protein and fatty substances.  This myelin sheath allows electrical 
impulses to transmit quickly and efficiently along the nerve cells.”). 
 58.  Synaptic pruning eliminates excessive synapses not being utilized.  See Beatriz Luna et al., 
Maturation of Widely Distributed Brain Function Subserves Cognitive Development, 13 NEUROIMAGE 786, 
791 (2001) (“Synaptic pruning and myelination during childhood and adolescence are important for enhancing 
widely distributed brain functions by refining synaptic connections and enhancing the transfer of information 
throughout the brain in a rapid manner.”). 
 59.  See Debra Kelly, The Difference Between Teenage Brains and Adult Brains, KNOWLEDGENUTS 
(July 25, 2014), http://knowledgenuts.com/2014/07/25/the-difference-between-teenage-brains-and-adult-
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connections, and some, many, of those must be pruned so that the important 
connections that facilitate successful (i.e., socially acceptable and efficacious) 
behavior will thrive.60  There is certainly sufficient behavioral evidence to 
confirm that something is going on in the adolescent brain, and neuroscience is 
able to confirm just what that something is.61 
But myelination and neural pruning are processes and, as such, may 
proceed at different rates in different people.  While we might be able to look 
at an fMRI of an adolescent brain and venture a judgment (guess?) as to how 
“maturely” the adolescent with that brain structure would behave, we cannot 
certainly determine social maturity by reference to such a scan.  We could not 
accurately predict the pace or eventual extent of development from such a scan 
either.62  Brains are products of “nature” (i.e., genetic predispositions) and 
“nurture” (i.e., environmental forces).  So even if two brains started out 
structurally identical (surely an impossibility), they would not mature in 
precisely the same way, because they would necessarily be subject to different 
environmental circumstances, and that is even true of identical twins raised in 
the same home.63 
It is difficult, then, even impossible, to accurately coordinate the law with 
the mental ability of particular adolescents.64  We fix rules just short of the 
point at which the cost of further precision in the rule’s application would be 
greater than the social benefit realized from that precision.  A gross example 
would be the voting age: there are certainly sixteen-year-olds who have more 
of the mental maturity (considering what all that might entail) necessary to 
vote responsibly than some forty-five-year-olds, but we use the bright line, 
eighteen years of age, as a certain and accessible determinant of the right to 
vote.65  The cost of greater specificity would be too great to justify the costs 
(including the political costs of purporting to make those judgments reliably).  
For the most part, we are comfortable with rules that seem to come close 
enough to the mark: eighteen for voting, sixteen for driving, and twenty-one 
for drinking.  But what if life and death are at stake? 
 
brains/ (“In an adult brain, there are a number of neural connections that allow the different parts of the brain 
to all work together.  In the teenage brain, these connections aren’t fully formed yet . . . .”).  
 60.  Sara B. Johnson et al., Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and Pitfalls of 
Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 216, 217 (2009). 
 61.  See Blakemore, supra note 56. 
 62.  See Stephanie Burnett et al., The Social Brain in Adolescence: Evidence from Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging and Behavioural Studies, 35 NEUROSCI. & BIOBEHAV. REV. 1654, 1657 (2011), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4538788/ (“Whether these changes correspond to continuing 
improvement in recognition accuracy for facial emotions, or to some other cognitive process, remains to be 
determined experimentally.”). 
 63.  See generally JUDITH RICH HARRIS, NO TWO ALIKE: HUMAN NATURE AND HUMAN INDIVIDUALITY 
(2006) (developing theory of human individuality). 
 64.  Indeed, it is impossible to coordinate the law with any particular person.  Professor Adam Kolber 
notes that identical criminal sentencing can lead to disparate levels of punishment depending on the offender’s 
baseline condition.  Adam J. Kolber, The Comparative Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565, 1566 
(2009) (“When we recognize the comparative nature of punishment, we see that, by putting two equally 
blameworthy offenders in prison for equal durations, the offender with the better baseline condition is likely 
punished more severely than the offender with the worse baseline condition.”). 
 65.  Brandon Griggs, Should the U.S. Lower Its Drinking Age, CNN (Jan. 4, 2015, 10:15 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/16/us/legal-drinking-age/. 
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The editors of L&N distinguish this group neuro-capacity issue from the 
individual assessments made in cases such as Mr. Weinstein’s: the question is 
different and the science is different.  We can look at a brain scan of a broad 
cross-section of adolescents and compare that with a brain scan of a broad 
cross-section of adults and see significant differences that might well justify 
substantial legal distinctions.  But we neither know, nor even could know, 
where a particular adolescent is on the developmental curve.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has confronted this challenge in a line of cases considering the 
normative significance of brain development revealed by advances in 
neuroscience.66  L&N includes the central cases, and carefully collects and 
edits the commentaries (legal and scientific) that have engaged the challenge.67  
Can neuroscience support the conclusion that an adolescent who murders, 
viciously and in cold blood, is not sufficiently mature, as a neural matter, to 
receive capital punishment or life imprisonment, but is sufficiently mature to 
make the decision about whether to have an abortion on her own, without 
parental involvement? 
We might conclude that those two ostensibly contradictory conclusions 
are untenable, or we might not.  We are used to drawing certain connections 
that it seems rational, in our folk psychological estimation, to draw: maturity of 
one kind, for one purpose and with regard to one question, would be a reliable 
indicator of maturity of other kinds, for other purposes and with regard to other 
questions.  But cognitive psychology may draw distinctions where folk 
psychology cannot, and the distinctions that cognitive psychology will 
recognize may have salience so far as the normative balance struck by legal 
doctrine is concerned.  If we recognize that the decision whether to kill in cold 
blood as part of a teenage escapade is neurologically different from the 
decision to have an abortion,68 we might well conclude that a sixteen-year-old 
is competent to make one decision, and suffer the consequences therefor, but is 
 
 66.  See supra note 46 (discussing L&N’s treatment of Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and 
Miller v. Alabama); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (stating that death penalty for offenders 
under eighteen unconstitutional); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (stating that offenders under eighteen 
at time of crime cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for non-homicide 
crimes); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (stating that mandatory life sentence without possibility of 
parole for juvenile offenders is unconstitutional). 
 67.  See L&N, supra note 7, at 72–74, 84–87, 96–98 (providing excerpts from Brief for the American 
Psychological Association, and the Missouri Psychological Association as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Letter to E. Joshua Rosenkrantz from Developmental 
Neuroscientists (July 16, 2009); Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric 
Association, National Association of Social Workers, and Mental Health America in Support of Petitioner, 
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 
86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765 (2011); Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal 
Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2006)). 
 68.  See L&N, supra note 7, at 579–82 (providing excerpt of Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents 
Less Mature Than Adults?: Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA 
“Flip-Flop”, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 593 (2009)); see also Steinberg et al., supra, at 593 (“In our view, 
then, the seemingly conflicting positions taken by APA in Roper v. Simmons (2005) and Hodgson v. 
Minnesota (1990) are not contradictory.  Rather, they simply emphasize different aspects of maturity, in 
accordance with the differing nature of the decision-making scenarios involved in each case.  The skills and 
abilities necessary to make an informed decision about a medical procedure are likely in place several years 
before the capacities necessary to regulate one’s behavior under conditions of emotional arousal or coercive 
pressure from peers.”). 
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not similarly able to make the other decision.  So, then, it may be entirely 
consistent, and correct, as a matter of cognitive neuroscience, to proscribe 
imposition of capital punishment for the adolescent who murders in cold 
blood69 but permit the adolescent to make the decision to have an abortion 
without parental notification.70  That is, what seem to be two iterations of the 
same question71 may in fact be significantly different in light of cognitive 
neuroscientific insights.  And once that distinction is established empirically, 
certainly coherent legal doctrine, at least normatively coherent legal doctrine, 
would reflect that distinction.  Now, there may well be other political, social, 
or behavioral reasons or evidence that would support such a distinction as well, 
but it would seem that the neuroscientific support would be at least as, and 
perhaps more, fundamental than alternative bases. 
That confluence of considerations signals the paradigmatic shift, a shift 
demonstrated by the materials collected in and the presentation of L&N.  The 
breadth and level of inquiry at this juncture in the book is profound.  Indeed, in 
this part of the book and in the many others like it,72 you get the very real sense 
that the normative ground is shifting under your feet: the law will now have to 
ask new questions, or at least the familiar questions in new ways, in order to 
vindicate the normative coherence and integrity of the doctrine.  Folk 
psychology can take us, has taken us, only so far.  And often, folk psychology 
suggests inconsistencies—such as the proscription of capital punishment for 
adolescents on account of their intellectual and emotional immaturity but 
vindication of minors’ right to abortion without parental consent—that 
cognitive neuroscience can reconcile. 
 
 69.  See L&N, supra note 7, at 74–84 (excerpting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)).  The 
defendant in Roper, seventeen at the time of the crime, planned the murder in advance: 
In chilling, callous terms he talked about his plan, discussing it for the most part with two 
friends, Charles Benjamin and John Tessmer, then aged 15 and 16 respectively.  Simmons 
proposed to commit burglary and murder by breaking and entering, tying up a victim, and 
throwing the victim off a bridge.  Simmons assured his friends they could “get away with it” 
because they were minors. 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 556.  The Court proscribed the death penalty for offenders under eighteen years old at the 
time of the crime.  Id. at 578. 
 70.  See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 450 (1990) (“[T]he requirement that both parents be 
notified, whether or not both wish to be notified or have assumed responsibility for the upbringing of the child, 
does not reasonably further any legitimate state interest.”). 
 71.  Or so they seemed to Justice Scalia.  See Roper, 543 U.S. at 617–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  His 
dissent pointed out that the American Psychological Association had taken, what Justice Scalia characterized 
as, inconsistent positions in Roper and Hodgson: 
As petitioner points out, the American Psychological Association (APA), which claims in this 
case that scientific evidence shows persons under 18 lack the ability to take moral responsibility 
for their decisions, has previously taken precisely the opposite position before this very Court.  
In its brief in Hodgson v. Minnesota, . . . the APA found a “rich body of research” showing that 
juveniles are mature enough to decide whether to obtain an abortion without parental 
involvement.  The APA brief, citing psychology treatises and studies too numerous to list here, 
asserted: “[B]y middle adolescence (age 14–15) young people develop abilities similar to adults 
in reasoning about moral dilemmas, understanding social rules and laws, [and] reasoning about 
interpersonal relationships and interpersonal problems.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 72.  See L&N, supra note 7, at 591–626 (discussing addiction); id. at 335–52 (neuroimaging and pain); 
id. at 353–55 (blurring of tort law’s mental versus bodily injury distinction). 
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D. The Persistent Challenge 
Notwithstanding L&N’s presentation of the promise (or, at least, 
potential) of neuroscience to impact the law (both the pertinent evidence and 
the doctrine), the editors are very careful throughout to take account of the 
limitations of the current science, as well as the ways in which a little bit of 
knowledge may be a dangerous thing.  Chapter 9 of the book follows the two 
chapters in which the editors present the science: a succinct primer on the brain 
(Chapter 7) and a survey of current imaging techniques (Chapter 8).  The third 
chapter in that scientific triptych surveys the limitations of extant techniques 
and technologies both independently and in relation to one another.  The 
presentation demonstrates how complementary use of different techniques may 
overcome the limitations of any one73 but also candidly describes what the 
science just cannot (yet) do.74  This acknowledgement of the state of the 
science is perfectly calibrated to discourage too much enthusiasm but also to 
propose something of an agenda: we learn what the science cannot (yet) do and 
how those deficiencies matter to reevaluation of the normative coherence of 
extant doctrine. 
Though there certainly is reason to believe that there may be too much 
enthusiasm too soon for what neuroscience may accomplish, we would dismiss 
its challenge to the normative assumptions of legal doctrine at our peril.  L&N 
quite well describes the limitations of the science but also treats the limits of 
the limits,75 so to speak.  It is crucial that we know just what the science cannot 
do so that we will have a better sense of what it can do and what we need to 
refine before we can make more confident assumptions about human agency 
that would be crucial to the normative calculus. 
The brief survey of L&N’s method developed in this Part supports the 
important fundamental inquiry that challenges law’s normativity.  It is to that 
 
 73.  See id. ch. 8 (discussing advantages of each technology). 
 74.  See, e.g., id. at 254–61 (discussing limitations of fMRI); id. at 250–53 (limitations of 
electroencephalography); id. at 225 (limitations of MRI); id. at 226 (limitations of Diffusor Tensor Imaging).  
L&N also provides an informative excerpt from Owen Jones et al., discussing some of the limitations of fMRI.  
See id. at 247–50 (reproducing in part Owen D. Jones et al., Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the 
Perplexed, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5 (2009)). 
 75.  See id. at 504–09 (providing alternative perspectives on the limitations and future admissibility of 
brain-based lie detection in the courtroom).  An excerpt from Frederick Schauer notes that fMRI, though 
flawed, may be more reliable than juries: 
In law as in science, “compared to what?” is an important question. . . .  Currently the jury or 
judge (when there is no jury) determines if witnesses are telling the truth. . . .  [J]uries rely on 
numerous myths, urban legends, and pop psychology with little reliability.  They distrust 
witnesses who perspire, fidget, and fail to make eye contact, and trust those who speak 
confidently while looking directly at them. 
Id. at 505 (excerpting Frederick Schauer, Neuroscience, Lie-Detection, and the Law, 14 TRENDS COGNITIVE 
SCI. 101 (2010)).  Henry Greely, however, argues for regulation of the sale of lie detection devices: 
A better solution, both for courts and more generally, would be to pass federal legislation 
requiring FDA-like regulation of all lie-detection drugs and devices . . . .  We should prohibit 
the sale, marketing, distribution, or use of lie detectors until they have proven, by rigorous trials, 
to be safe and effective. . . .  Should any improvement over a veteran FBI investigator, an 
experienced judge or a careful lay observer, be sufficient? . . . The correct answers are not 
obvious. 
Id. at 507–08 (excerpting Henry T. Greely, Premarket Approval Regulation for Lie Detections: An Idea Whose 
Time May Be Coming, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 50 (2005)). 
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challenge, and L&N’s treatment of it, that we now turn. 
III. PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 
From a philosophical perspective, the most important part of L&N is Part 
2: “Brain, Behavior, and Responsibility.”  This is where students of human 
nature will want to dig deepest, for it is where the book addresses the relevance 
of neuroscience to our understanding of human agency—of rationality, of 
decision making and action, of moral and legal responsibility.  This will be the 
focus of the remainder of our review. 
The heart of Part 2 is Chapter 5, “Behavior and Responsibility: Views 
from Law and Neuroscience.”  This chapter offers a range of views concerning 
the correct relationship between law and neuroscience.  At one extreme, 
philosopher Hilary Bok argues that neuroscience has no bearing on whether we 
have free will or whether we are morally responsible.76  At the other, biologist 
Jerry Coyne argues that free will, understood as the ability to act otherwise, is 
ruled out by the laws of physics, which in turn rules out moral responsibility.77  
Between Bok and Coyne lie a handful of views, most of which are 
conciliatory.  Most aspire to preserve a modest form of responsibility despite 
the threats posed by neuroscience to our understanding of agency. 
For us, most of the views in Chapter 5 fail to appreciate the radical 
implications of neuroscience for the law.  We suggest that, as the paradigm 
continues to shift, future editions of L&N will need to expand the range of 
views in Chapter 5 to include these radical implications.  In defense of our 
view, we begin with the naysayers, with those who deny the importance of 
neuroscience for understanding human agency and responsibility.  After 
explaining why those views fail to appreciate the unsettling implications of 
recent findings in neuroscience, we turn to theorists who aspire to preserve a 
relatively modest form of responsibility, and we explain why we think even 
those views do not go far enough.  We conclude with the suggestion that our 
view captures the spirit and much of the letter of the biological behavioral 
model defended in an excerpt incorporated earlier in Part 2 (in Chapter 4) by 
Owen Jones and Timothy Goldsmith.78 
A. Compatibilism and Folk Psychology: The Naysayers 
Hilary Bok is a compatibilist concerning freedom of will.79  Even if 
metaphysical determinism is true—even if every event, including every 
decision and action, is necessitated by the conjunction of prior events and the 
laws of nature80—still, some decisions and actions are nonetheless free.  How 
 
 76.  Id. at 130–32. 
 77.  Id. at 129–30. 
 78.  Id. at 107–17. 
 79.  Russell Blackford, Hilary Bok on Free Will, TALKING PHIL. (Apr. 2, 2012), http://blog.talking 
philosophy.com/?p=4568. 
 80.  This is roughly the definition given by van Inwagen.  See Peter van Inwagen, The Incompatibility of 
Free Will and Determinism, 27 PHIL. STUD. 185, 198 (1975). 
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can that be? 
In the short selection included in Chapter 5, Bok’s argument for 
compatibilism goes something like this: 
P1: In some cases, a person’s actions depend on her choices, where 
those choices entail the existence of alternative actions.81 
P2: Some actions do in fact depend on prior choice. 
C1: Therefore, for some choices, there exist alternative courses of 
action.82 
P3: If, in choosing between alternatives, a person steps back and 
produces a reasoned choice, the resulting choice and action are 
free. 
P4: In some cases, persons do step back and produce reasoned 
choices between alternatives. 
C2: Therefore, some actions are the result of a free choice (or a free 
will).83 
For our purposes, the crucial claim is that, in some cases of deliberation, a 
person is “capable of stepping back from her existing motivations and habits, 
and making a reasoned decision among [alternative courses of action].”84  If 
that capacity for reasoned decision making obtains, then, “according to 
compatibilists, she [the agent] is free.”85  This is Bok’s fourth premise. 
That premise is crucial in two ways.  First, it appears to conflict with 
Bok’s main thesis concerning the irrelevance of neuroscience to free will.  For, 
according to Bok, free will requires the capacity to “step back” from our 
motivations and habits (presumably to tamp down the effects of our passions 
and prejudices), and the capacity to reason about how to act.86  But that means 
free will requires a host of specific psychological capacities.  If neuroscience 
were to discover that, contrary to appearances, humans do not possess those 
capacities, then Bok’s compatibilism would fail.  More precisely, Bok’s 
compatibilism is plausible only if we discover that the psychological capacities 
required by her theory are in fact implemented in the nervous system of 
organisms like us. 
 
 81.  The alleged entailment in P1 is conceptual: if some event is a choice, then, given the meaning of 
“choice,” that event involves the ruling out of alternative actions in favor of the action performed, in which 
case alternatives must exist. 
 82.  Although our focus is Bok’s fourth premise, skepticism concerning P1 (and thus C1) must be noted.  
Suppose determinism is true—suppose, à la van Inwagen, that every event, including every action, is 
necessitated by the conjunction of past events and the laws of nature.  (That determinism might be true is, of 
course, a supposition that all compatibilists allow.)  Then, for any “choice” we seem to make, there is one and 
only one available course of action.  Hence, if determinism is true, genuinely alternative actions are 
metaphysically impossible.  Bok of course knows this.  That is why she insists on a strong distinction between 
the theoretical point of view—the perspective from which we comprehend the possible truth of determinism—
and the practical point of view—the perspective of the active agent who must decide how to act.  This is also 
why Bok insists on the primacy of the practical in questions of free will and responsibility.  See HILARY BOK, 
FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 100 (1998).  As will become clear, however, we do not think the theoretical-
practical distinction can bear the weight of Bok’s argument. 
 83.  L&N, supra note 7, at 130–32. 
 84.  Id. at 131. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  See BOK, supra note 82, at 119. 
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Second, we should be skeptical of Bok’s compatibilism and, indeed, any 
form of compatibilism.87  As we describe below, there exists compelling 
evidence that we are not the kinds of organisms that compatibilist theories 
require.  We are not, in particular, capable of rational deliberation in ways 
required for the attribution of responsibility. 
Now, consider the well-known views of legal theorist Stephen Morse.  
Like Bok, Morse is a compatibilist who believes free will is irrelevant to 
responsibility or, more narrowly, to legal responsibility.88  Unlike Bok, 
however, Morse does not think the presumed truth of compatibilism can 
establish the irrelevance of neuroscience to our view of ourselves as 
responsible agents.89  To the contrary, Morse grants that neuroscience could 
undermine our present view of ourselves.90  But he also insists that, to date, it 
has not done so.91 
Morse’s view boils down to three assertions.  There is, first, a more or 
less specific view of persons built into the very fabric of criminal law, namely, 
the view provided by our folk psychological intuitions.92  Second, according to 
our folk view, persons are responsible insofar as they are capable of engaging 
in practical reason93 and acting on the basis of its deliverances.94  Third, to 
date, neuroscience has discovered nothing to suggest that we are not possessed 
of that capacity: 
Given how little we know about the brain-mind and brain-action 
connections, to claim based on neuroscience that we should radically 
change our picture of ourselves and our practices is a form of 
 
 87.  Consider, for example, neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga’s endorsement of a compatibilist view 
(also represented in Chapter 5).   He claims that “brain determinism has no relevance to the concept of 
personal responsibility,” and, moreover, that “responsibility exists at a different level of organization: the 
social level, not in our determined brains.”  L&N, supra note 7, at 133–34.  Now, the excerpt from Gazzaniga 
is too brief to do justice to his larger view.  Yet, the flavor of his remarks prompts us to observe that, in light of 
the evidence described below, moving from the neural to the social level in no way diminishes the threats 
posed by neuroscience to responsibility.  How could it, if all our social attachments are mediated by our 
nervous systems, if all social relations are relations between nervous systems, especially between brains?  
Since neuroscience might discover that we lack the capacities required for responsibility in our social relations, 
the brain-based threat to responsibility remains.  That social relations are neural relations is a view developed 
in recent work in social neuroscience, the progeny of a mating between social psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience.  For an overview, see Dylan Wagner et al., The Representation of Self and Person Knowledge in 
the Medical Prefrontal Cortex, in 3 WILEY INTERDISC. REV. COGNITIVE SCI. 451 (2012). 
 88.  Morse, supra note 49, at 2. 
 89.  See L&N, supra note 7, at 123. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 128. 
 92.  Id. at 123 (citing Stephen J. Morse, Neuroscience and the Future of Personhood and Responsibility, 
in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds., 
2011)) (“Criminal law presupposes a ‘folk psychological’ view of the person and behavior.”); see also Michael 
S. Moore, Responsible Choices, Desert-Based Legal Institutions, and the Challenges of Contemporary 
Neuroscience, 29 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 233, 237–44 (2012); Michael S. Moore, Libet’s Challenge(s) to 
Responsible Agency, in CONSCIOUS WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY: A TRIBUTE TO BENJAMIN LIBET 207 (Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel eds., 2011). 
 93.  We unpack the relevant notion of practical reason in the next section. 
 94.  Here are two excerpts from Morse’s contribution to Chapter 5: “[T]he law’s view is that people are 
capable of acting for reasons and are capable of minimal rationality according to predominantly conventional, 
socially constructed standards.”  L&N, supra note 7, at 124.  “The general capacity for rationality is the 
primary condition for responsibility and the lack of that capacity is the primary condition for excusing a 
person.”  Id. at 125.  For further instances of the same claim, see Morse, supra note 49. 
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neuroarrogance. . . .  There is little reason at present to believe that 
we are not agents.95 
Well then!  Thanks to Bok and Morse, readers of L&N are confronted 
with a lovely challenge.  Is it true that there is “little reason” (Morse) or no 
reason (Bok) to believe that neuroscience undermines the view we have of 
ourselves as rational and thus responsible agents?  Is Morse right that the 
balance of scientific evidence supports the folk view of humans as possessed 
of a general capacity for practical rationality?  Are we guilty of 
“neuroarrogance” if we claim otherwise?  We think the answer to all three 
questions is “no,” and shall explain why. 
B. Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 
Our explanation is too complex to reproduce here in full, as it appeals to a 
convergence of evidence from several disciplines.  We can, however, point to a 
few significant discoveries and then describe one way those discoveries 
converge on a conclusion that threatens our view of ourselves as practically 
rational and thus morally and legally responsible.  For concreteness, we focus 
on criminal responsibility.  We assume, along with Morse and our alleged folk 
intuitions, that a person is criminally responsible only if her action was un-
coerced and only if she was capable of rational, practical deliberation prior to 
her action.  But what is rational, practical deliberation?  And what capacities 
are integral to it? 
Although philosophical theories of practical reason are as diverse as they 
are legion,96 the myriad subtleties do not matter here.  The following model 
suffices for our purposes: if an agent has goal G—if he is motivated to bring 
about G—and if the agent believes he can bring about G by performing action 
A with equal or greater efficiency than other available actions, then, if he is 
rational, and if he has no contravening goals stronger than G, he will infer that 
he ought to do A. 
Suppose you have the goal of deciding whether to adopt L&N as the text 
for a course you are scheduled to teach.  Suppose your goal is to decide 
whether L&N is sufficiently interdisciplinary for your purposes.  Suppose 
further that, to your delight, you just learned that a review of that book by a 
legal theorist and a philosopher is available!  You now have, let us assume, 
strong motivation to track down and read our review.  Suppose you also know 
the most efficient ways to obtain a copy of our review.  Then, if you are 
rational, and if you do not have a stronger goal which conflicts with your 
obtaining a copy of our review, you will infer from the conjunction of your 
motivation and knowledge that you ought to perform those actions. 
We assume that, in order to instantiate this overly simple model of 
 
 95.  L&N, supra note 7, at 128. 
 96.  For helpful overviews of recent philosophical theories of practical reason, see R. Jay Wallace, 
Practical Reason, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Mar. 26, 2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practical-
reason/ and Elijah Millgram, Practical Reason and the Structure of Actions, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (May 
11, 2016), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practical-reason-action/. 
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practical reason, the rational deliberator must possess the following minimal 
capacities: 
(1) The capacity to know and understand facts relevant to the 
action;97 
(2) The capacity to be motivated to perform, and also to not 
perform, the action;98 
(3) The capacity to assign evaluative weights to the competing 
actions;99 and 
(4) The capacity to reason from one’s knowledge and motivation 
to the conclusion that one ought to perform the action or to the 
conclusion that one ought to refrain.100 
In addition, practical reasoning requires that the agent be: 
(5) Responsive to reasons (motivations) that play a causal role in 
one’s decisions and actions. 
If we draw inferences from premises that do not refer to the causes of our 
action, then we are not really reasoning about our action.  We might be 
concocting a rationale for acting—a story to tell if called upon to say why we 
acted as we did—but insofar as our rationale fails to specify the factors that in 
fact caused us to act, it is at best a rationale for an action we did not perform.  
In many instances, of course, people wholeheartedly believe the rationales they 
give for their actions even when the rationales are false.  But, we take it as 
obvious that something can be a reason for an action only if it is among the 
causal factors for that action.  That is a point on which Morse agrees.101 
If those requirements are indeed necessary for practical reason, and if 
practical reasoning is required for responsibility, then evidence that we lack 
one or more of those capacities would show that our view of responsibility is 
under threat.  More precisely, if the evidence shows that we lack those 
capacities under normal conditions in day-to-day living—the conditions under 
which most attributions of legal responsibility are made—then the threat to 
responsibility is substantial. 
Such evidence, we will now argue, is indeed available and rests upon the 
integration of recent discoveries in cognitive neuroscience and affective 
 
 97.  Including the fact, in the criminal law context, that the proposed action is illegal and may result in 
the loss of one’s liberties. 
 98.  If we are not motivated at a time to perform two or more distinct actions—for example, to perform 
and to not perform the illegal action—our deliberative capacities would not kick in. 
 99.  If we are incapable of comparing what we take to be the immediate or long-term consequences of 
performing two or more distinct actions, we can hardly be said to be deliberating. 
 100.  If we are incapable of inferring from relevant premises (relevant knowledge and motivation) to a 
practical conclusion (a specific action), then, while we may be engaged in some sort of mental activity, we are 
not engaged in practical reasoning. 
 101.  See Morse, supra note 49, at 19 (“At present, the law’s ‘official’ position—that conscious, 
intentional, rational and uncompelled agents may properly be held responsible—is justified unless and until 
neuroscience or any other discipline demonstrates convincingly that humans are not the creatures we think we 
are.  That is, if humans are not conscious and intentional creatures who act for reasons that play a causal role 
in our behavior, then the foundational facts for responsibility ascriptions are mistaken.” (emphasis added)).  
That is also a point on which philosophers disagree.  For further discussion, see Wallace, supra note 96 and 
Millgram, supra note 96. 
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neuroscience.  The integration of these discoveries supports two crucial claims.  
First, many actions are causally influenced by affective processes about which 
we cannot practically reason, precisely because the affective processes do not 
rise to conscious awareness.  Second, some information about our affective 
processes can rise to conscious awareness, but when this occurs, the 
information sometimes fails to represent the actual causal processes 
involved.102  Such integration, we contend, casts doubt on the assumption that 
we are equipped with the capacities for practical reason itemized in (1)–(5) 
above.103 
We begin with Jaak Panksepp, the father of affective neuroscience.104  
Panksepp hypothesizes that there exists in all of us an ancestral mammalian 
mind implemented in sub-cortical processes.105  Three features of this ancestral 
mind are crucial.  It is constituted by relatively primitive affective capacities, 
and it is endogenous and autonomous.  It is endogenous in that it comprises a 
set of capacities that do not require any learning for their operations.  It is 
autonomous in that its operations require no signals or feedback from cortical 
capacities.106 
The evidence for Panksepp’s ancestral mind is extensive.  We will 
mention just three considerations.  First, the endogenous nature of our sub-
cortical affective systems can be illustrated by the FEAR system.107  FEAR can 
 
 102.  Although the discussion in L&N focuses on a range of information from cognitive neuroscience, we 
suggest that, as the paradigm continues to shift, future editions will need to incorporate discoveries in affective 
neuroscience, including the ones discussed below. 
 103.  A fuller explanation of the importance of integrating cognitive and affective neuroscience is given 
in a different context—a discussion of neuro-interventions—in Paul S. Davies, Foundational Facts for Legal 
Responsibility: Human Agency and the Aims of Restorative Neuro-Interventions (forthcoming). 
 104.  Panksepp’s discoveries of the sub-cortical systems that comprise our ancestral minds date back to 
the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.  See, e.g., Jaak Panksepp & Jay A. Trowill, Intraoral Self-Injection I & II, 9 
PSYCHONOMIC SCI. 405, 407 (1967); Jaak Panksepp et al., Modulation of Hypothalamic Self-Stimulation and 
Escape Behavior by Chlordiazepoxide, 5 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 965 (1970); Jaak Panksepp et al., The 
Biology of Social Attachments: Opiates Alleviate Separation Distress, 13 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 607 
(1978); Jaak Panksepp & William W. Beatty, Social Deprivation and Play in Rats, 30 BEHAV. & NEURAL 
BIOLOGY 197 (1980); Jaak Panksepp, Toward a General Psychobiological Theory of Emotions, 5 BEHAV. & 
BRAIN SCI. 407 (1982); Jaak Panksepp, Mood Changes, in HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL NEUROLOGY 271 (P.J. 
Vinken et al. eds., 1985); Jaak Panksepp, The Anatomy of Emotions, in EMOTION: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND 
EXPERIENCE VOL. III. BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EMOTION 91 (Robert Plutchik ed., 1986); Jaak Panksepp, 
Toward a Neuro-Cognitive Psychology of Emotions, 32 CONTEMP. PSYCHOL. 799 (1987) (book review).  The 
first truly comprehensive statement of his theory is in his 1998 book, AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN AND ANIMAL EMOTIONS.  For an updated statement of his theory, see JAAK 
PANKSEPP & LUCY BIVEN, THE ARCHEOLOGY OF MIND: NEUROEVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF HUMAN EMOTIONS 
(2012). 
 105.  See JAAK PANKSEPP, AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN AND ANIMAL 
EMOTIONS 41–59 (1998).  See also Panksepp’s many journal publications in which he presents his view, for 
example, Jaak Panksepp, On the Embodied Neural Nature of Core Emotional Affects, 12 J. CONSCIOUSNESS 
STUD. 158 (2005); Jaak Panksepp, Cross-Species Affective Neuroscience Decoding of the Primal Affective 
Experiences of Humans and Related Animals, PLOS ONE (Sept. 2011), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/ 
file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0021236&type=printable. 
 106.  We borrow the terms “endogenous” and “autonomous” from WILLIAM BECHTEL, MENTAL 
MECHANISMS: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE (2008).  To the best of our 
knowledge, Panksepp does not use these specific terms, but Bechtel’s usage is apt for describing Panksepp’s 
view. 
 107.  See PANKSEPP, supra note 105, at 51.  Panksepp uses uppercase lettering to designate the sub-
cortical affective systems he has discovered and to highlight his claim that the functional effects of these 
systems do not map neatly onto our folk psychological emotional categories.  The functions fulfilled by the 
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be triggered in rats by an external stimulus, such as a well-placed tuft of cat 
fur,108 or an internal stimulus, such as a well-placed electrical current.109  
Indeed, if we stimulate any of the brain areas involved in fear—the central and 
medial amygdala, the medial hypothalamus, or parts of the brain stem—the 
animal will freeze at low levels of current and try to flee at higher levels, and it 
will exhibit autonomic responses typical of fear.110  This holds for rats, cats, 
and every mammal species tested thus far.111 
Second, Panksepp’s primary-process systems are not only endogenous 
but also autonomous.  This is clear from experiments in which the entire cortex 
of an infant mammal is surgically removed and the animal is raised along with 
its intact siblings.112  Rough and tumble play, for instance, is a vital form of 
social interaction, and the play behavior of decorticated rats is difficult to 
distinguish from those whose brains are intact.113  As Sergio and Vivien Pellis 
put it, “Play fights that involve decorticated rats are just as intricate, sustained, 
and repeated as those of intact rats, with escalation to serious fighting being 
rare.  Together, these properties suggest that even without a cortex, such rats 
are capable of the reciprocity necessary to sustain playfulness.”114  Although 
they go on to identify two age-related differences that occur in male 
decorticated rats, differences that depend on cortical structures,115 Pellis & 
Pellis, along with Panksepp and his collaborators, are clear that crucial 
emotional and social capacities are effectively implemented in sub-cortical 
structures and do not depend for their operations on any cortical structures.116 
Third, and crucially, these endogenous, autonomous sub-cortical systems 
do not only exist in non-human mammals.  They exist in us as well.  We know 
this in part because sub-cortical systems in humans are functionally 
 
FEAR system, for instance, do not overlap the full range of instances in which we, on the basis of our folk 
psychological heritage, would apply the vernacular term “fear.”  Panksepp puts it this way: “[Uppercase 
lettering is used] to alert the reader to the fact that I am using the term in a scientific rather than simply a 
vernacular way: I am talking about a specific neural system of the brain that is assumed to be a major source 
process for the emergence of the related vernacular terminologies but which in the present context has a more 
clearly restricted neuro-functional referent.”  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 18. 
 109.  Id. at 213. 
 110.  Id. at 215–16. 
 111.  Id. at 206–24; PANKSEPP & BIVEN, supra note 104, at 175–202.  In addition to discovering the sub-
cortical FEAR system, Panksepp has discovered six other sub-cortical affective systems, including FEAR, 
RAGE, LUST, CARE, GRIEF, PLAY, and SEEKING.  See generally PANKSEPP & BIVEN, supra note 104, at 
175–202.  He describes these systems as “primary-process” affective systems, where a system is primary if it 
is endogenous or built into the structure of the brain.  Id.  It is worth emphasizing that six of Panksepp’s seven 
systems fulfill functions that are largely social. 
 112.  PANKSEPP, supra note 105, at 291; Jaak Panksepp et al., Effects of Neonatal Decortication on the 
Social Play of Juvenile Rats, 56 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 429 (1994). 
 113.  PANKSEPP, supra note 105, at 291; Panksepp et al., Effects of Neonatal Decortication, supra note 
112; SERGIO PELLIS & VIVIEN PELLIS, THE PLAYFUL BRAIN: VENTURING TO THE LIMITS OF NEUROSCIENCE 
(2010). 
 114.  PELLIS & PELLIS, supra note 113, at 48. 
 115.  Id. at 51. 
 116.  This is not to deny that cortical structures interact with sub-cortical structures in intact organisms; 
surely, they do.  What is clear is that the sub-cortical capacities of these animals are sufficient on their own for 
a range of emotional and social competencies.  Hence our claim that such systems are not only endogenous, 
but autonomous as well. 
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homologous with those in other mammals.117  But we also know this from the 
study of human children born with little or no cortical tissue.  Bjorn Merker 
describes a three-year-old girl born with very little in the way of functioning 
cortical tissue.118  He describes the child’s brain this way: “[s]pared 
ventromedial occipital and some midline cortical matter overlies an intact 
cerebellum and brainstem, whereas the rest of the cranium is filled with 
cerebrospinal fluid.”119  Merker goes on to point out that remnants of cortical 
tissue in anencephalic children typically develop no radiating connections to 
mid- and lower-brain structures and, in addition, may be found on autopsy to 
be gliotic.120  Such remnants are likely possessed of little or no function.121 
Yet, in a pair of contrasting photos included in Merker’s discussion, we 
see the young girl, Heather Joy, just as her father is setting her baby brother on 
her lap, followed by her reaction a second or two later as she feels the weight 
and warmth of her brother.  In the first photo, Heather has a look of wide-eyed 
expectancy; in the second, we see what appears to be an expression of intense 
pleasure, even joy.122  At the very least, she appears to be experiencing an 
affective state with a very positive valence.123 
The case of Heather Joy, along with similar cases documented by Alan 
Shewmon and colleagues,124 exemplify the autonomy of our sub-cortical 
affective capacities.  We see in Heather a pronounced affective reaction to a 
familiar stimulus125 (perhaps the feel, smell, and sound of her infant brother), 
and we see in the children studied by Shewmon a range of discriminatory, 
emotional, and social capacities, as well as a capacity for associative learning, 
all implemented sub-cortically.126  These are capacities that demonstrably 
operate in the absence of information from cortical structures.  This, then, is 
some of the evidence for Panksepp’s ancestral mind.  It is evidence that the 
brains of all humans comprise an ancestral, affective brain nestled beneath our 
modern cortical structures, implementing a mind that causally influences our 
discriminatory, emotional, and social capacities whether we realize it or not. 
At the same time, however, we know from Stanislas Dehaene’s theory of 
consciousness that emotional capacities implemented in sub-cortical 
structures—including the primary process systems discovered by Panksepp—
cannot rise to conscious awareness: not directly, at any rate.127  Since our 
argument rests upon an integration of Panksepp and Dehaene, we pause to 
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outline Dehaene’s theory. 
Dehaene studies a specific kind or level of conscious awareness, what he 
calls “consciousness-as-reportability”—a form of consciousness minimally 
required to give reasons for our actions and, therefore, to engage in practical 
reasoning.128  Dehaene’s central hypothesis is that this form of awareness is 
implemented in a complex and dynamic set of cortical structures.129  The main 
components of his model are threefold.  First, the human cortex comprises a set 
of functionally distinct areas, some more or less localizable, others 
distributed.130  Each of these areas is functionally specialized; each receives a 
specific range of information as input, processes that information, and sends 
the results to other brain areas.131  One such area is the global workspace—the 
second main component in Dehaene’s model.132  The workspace receives 
signals from functionally specialized brain areas and “broadcasts” them; it 
functions as a kind of central switching station, making incoming signals 
available to other specialized areas capable of receiving and processing 
them.133  The auditory cortex, for example, receives information produced by 
perceived speech sounds, processes that information, and sends the results to 
the workspace where they are broadcast and perhaps received by other areas—
including, in some instances, Broca’s area—where further processing may 
result in a verbal response to the perceived speech sounds.134 
The third component is a top-down attention mechanism capable of 
amplifying a proper subset of signals that reach the workspace.  When that 
mechanism amplifies a given signal, and if that amplification crosses a certain 
threshold, a self-sustaining processing loop will emerge.135  The content of the 
amplified signal then becomes the object of conscious awareness.136  In 
addition, the amplified signal is broadcast to other specialized areas, and when 
those other areas receive the amplified signal, their activity will typically 
increase, thereby expanding the scope of conscious awareness.137 
On this model, there are several ways a neural signal can fail to rise to 
conscious awareness.  For our purposes, the most decisive way is architectural.  
When a specialized brain area bears no architectural connections to the 
workspace, its outputs have no chance of rising to conscious awareness138: at 
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least not directly.  What might rise to awareness are the downstream somatic 
effects of that area.  Dehaene offers the following example: “[T]he activity of 
many neurons, for instance in subcortical and brainstem nuclei, is excluded 
from conscious mobilization (e.g., circuits for respiration or emotion).  In 
many cases we become aware of those circuits only through their indirect 
effects on other representations, such as in somatic cortical areas.”139  On this 
model, emotional or affective capacities implemented in sub-cortical areas 
cannot rise directly to conscious awareness, due to the very architecture of the 
brain.140  At most, the causal effects of these capacities may rise to awareness, 
but only indirectly. 
To appreciate the indirectness involved, consider the comparison to 
respiration.  Our myriad respiratory processes never send signals to the global 
workspace.  We become aware of respiratory distress only after the fact—we 
experience shortness of breath, for instance, only after we have been running 
for several seconds.  The same is true, according to Dehaene & Changeux, of 
our sub-cortical affective processes.141  Signals from those affective systems 
never reach the workspace.142  Instead, a sub-cortical system such as FEAR 
might produce a set of somatic changes.  If those somatic changes produce 
cortical representations that are broadcast to the global workspace, then we 
will likely become conscious of those somatic changes.  What comes to 
awareness are not outputs from the FEAR system, but representations of 
somatic changes, and insofar as these representations are ambiguous—insofar 
as, for example, tightness in the chest is symptomatic of processes other than 
fear—they require interpretation. 
Here, then, is our integration of affective and cognitive neuroscience: If 
Panksepp is correct, our ancestral affective mind animates all our deliberations, 
decisions, and actions.  Our primary-processes affects are causal factors for 
most, if not all, our actions.143  If Dehaene is right, none of our ancestral 
affective processes rise to conscious awareness; none has a direct route to 
awareness.144  At best, sub-cortical affects with sufficient strength produce 
downstream effects that might rise to awareness, and those effects are subject 
to interpretation (more on this presently).145  With this integration before us, let 
us now consider just two consequences, both of which cast doubt on the 
assumption that we are endowed with the minimal capacities for practical 
reason itemized above. 
The first consequence is simple but important.  Consider sub-cortical, 
affective processes that produce downstream somatic effects too weak to reach 
the global workspace.  Consider, for instance, the non-conscious effects of 
low-level anxiety, stress, fear, frustration, anger, depression, lust, etc.  These 
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effects no doubt influence our moods, motivations, decision making, and 
actions in myriad ways we fail to notice.146  Being too weak to reach the 
workspace, they nonetheless shape our psychology in ways that are difficult to 
discern from the first-person perspective, that is, from the perspective of 
consciousness-as-reportability.147 
It is worth noting, moreover, that the effects of low-level, non-conscious 
processes on our decisions and actions are abundantly confirmed by 
experiments in cognitive and social psychology.148  And when we combine 
such evidence from psychology with the above integration of affective and 
cognitive neuroscience, we are faced with a convergence of evidence that, in a 
wide range of cases, we are indeed moved by affective processes about which 
we have no reportable conscious awareness.149  There exist affective factors 
that contribute to our decisions and actions, about which we cannot practically 
reason.150  Such decisions and actions, therefore, are beyond the pale of 
responsibility, on the folk psychological assumption that we are responsible for 
actions performed as a consequence of practical reason. 
The second consequence, though less straightforward, is also of 
considerable importance.  Consider sub-cortical effects strong enough to reach 
the global workspace.  Despite reaching conscious awareness, the role of such 
effects in practical reason is fraught with difficulties, the most obvious being 
that they may amount to a form of internal coercion.151  The root worry is that 
we must interpret affective effects that come to awareness before we can 
employ them in our practical reasoning, and when our interpretations are 
incomplete or erroneous, the practical conclusions drawn may fail to track the 
actual causes of our action.152  When this happens, when our explicit reasons 
for acting are not among the actual causes, our action is due to factors outside 
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our deliberative field.153  Such actions result from factors we can neither resist 
nor endorse precisely because we have no awareness of their efficacy.154  In 
such cases, responsibility for our actions is attenuated on the same grounds that 
we withhold responsibility for actions due to compulsion.155 
Consider, for instance, cases in which sub-cortical fear produces tightness 
in the chest, sweaty palms, heightened sensory acuity, and so on.  If those 
symptoms are broadcast in the workspace, might they figure in our practical 
reasoning as required by conditions (1)–(5)?  Yes, but only if they are first 
interpreted.  Reasoning from downstream somatic effects of our affective 
processes is not the same as reasoning from our affective processes.156  We 
need some way to interpret those somatic effects, some means with which to 
assign them a motivational value.  We need to establish that, for any given set 
of somatic effects, they reliably indicate the causal efficacy of such-and-such 
sub-cortical affective system. 
But we have no such reliable method.  We have inferences to what may 
appear to be the best explanation, but in fact we have no reliable grounds to 
distinguish correct from incorrect inferences.157  This is so, at any rate, for a 
non-trivial range of cases.158  To see why this is so, recall Michael Gazzaniga’s 
split-brain subjects.159  We can be confident, in light of Gazzaniga’s 
experiments, that the following partial model of our practical reasoning 
capacities is highly plausible: 
The Neural-Damage-Deprivation Model of Giving Reasons: 
Whenever our left hemisphere operates in the absence of causally 
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relevant information isolated outside the left hemisphere (i.e., in the 
right hemisphere), it invents a “reason” for the agent’s action based 
on whatever information it can access.160 
Yet, if this model is plausible, it should be easy to generalize to a model with 
much greater scope, a model that applies to all persons: 
The Structural-Deprivation Model of Giving Reasons: Whenever 
our conscious, reason-giving capacities operate in the absence of 
causally relevant, non-conscious information, or in the presence of 
indirect, conscious information, they invent a “reason” for the 
agent’s action based on whatever information they can access. 
The Structural-Deprivation Model is compelling because, in one crucial 
respect, we are all like Gazzaniga’s subjects.  His subjects, as a result of 
surgery, were deprived of any architectural connections between the two 
hemispheres.161  If Dehaene and Panksepp are right, virtually all persons are 
constituted by an ancestral brain nestled inside modern cortical capacities, 
where the ancestral brain bears no architectural connections to our capacity for 
consciousness-as-reportability.162  The point is not that the direct connections 
have been surgically destroyed; the point is that they never evolved in the first 
place.163 
Given the non-existence of such architectural connections, the best we 
can do is interpret the indirect effects of our sub-cortical capacities.  The best 
we can do is what Gazzaniga’s subjects did: concoct an explanation by trying 
to make sense of the information that happens to be available.164  Of course, 
there is information available besides the felt downstream effects.  There is 
information about the immediate environment, patterns of past behavior, 
recollections of past interpretations, etc.  Yet, these additional forms of 
information were also available to Gazzaniga’s subjects.  And yet, based on all 
available information, those subjects wove a coherent interpretation of their 
actions that was nonetheless false.165  The point, of course, is that the 
information available to those subjects was critically incomplete and critically 
ambiguous.166 
Since we, like Gazzaniga’s subjects, are faced with the task of making as 
much sense as possible of information that is incomplete, or ambiguous, or 
both, we must accept that, in such cases, our interpretations have the same 
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status, namely, interpretations that may feel utterly correct from the first-
person perspective, but that nonetheless may be partially or wholly mistaken.  
Short of subjecting ourselves to controlled experiments, such inferences are, at 
bottom, hunches or guesses for which we have no generally reliable method of 
confirmation.  From the first-person perspective—the perspective from which 
we engage in practical reasoning—we are faced, in a non-trivial range of cases, 
with an impressive bit of self-ignorance. 
This form of interpretive self-ignorance gives rise to the second important 
consequence of our integration.  On Morse’s view, and as described above,167 
the reasons one employs in one’s practical inferences must be among the actual 
causes of our actions.  If you reason to some action on the basis of reasons that 
misrepresent the actual causes, then your conscious reasoning was, in part or in 
whole, causally irrelevant to the performance of that action.168  In such a case, 
the factors that actually caused you to act were outside your field of 
deliberative awareness.169  They were akin to a form of internal coercion, since 
you, the “conscious decision maker,” were impotent with respect to them. 
In cases such as this, attributions of criminal responsibility are out of 
place.  The folk intuitions that lead us to withhold responsibility in instances of 
coercion should likewise lead us to withhold it here.  Therefore, except when 
we have reasonable evidence that the agent’s expressed reasons match the 
actual causes of her actions, we are in no position to claim that folk 
psychological conditions for criminal responsibility are met. 
We conclude, therefore, that the Bok/Morse attempt to ground 
responsibility in practical reasoning conflicts with what is implicit170 in 
knowledge derived from affective and cognitive neuroscience.  The balance of 
evidence derived from the above integration is that we do not possess some of 
the required capacities for practical reason.  The causal effects of our ancestral 
minds on our actions, combined with the architectural and interpretative 
limitations of conscious awareness, suggest that we are not the kind of 
organisms required by compatibilist theories of free will or by our folk view of 
our own agentive capacities.171  And this discovery is of great significance to 
current conceptions of legal responsibility and, more generally, to all of the 
law. 
C. Thin Responsibility vs. Utilitarian Punishment? 
Some authors excerpted in Chapter 5—authors who, like us, insist on the 
relevance of neuroscience to free will and responsibility—wish to defend a 
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notion of responsibility that is far less robust than the ones endorsed by Bok 
and Morse.172  The excerpt from Patricia Churchland is illustrative.173  She 
suggests that the traditional debate on free will should be replaced with a 
neuroscientifically informed study of the differences between persons with 
normal control of themselves and persons with comprised control.174  And, in 
the final paragraph of her excerpt, Churchland seems to endorse the 
preservation of some notion of responsibility: “So is anyone ever responsible 
for anything?  Civic life requires it be so. . . .”175  Another illustration is the 
view proposed by Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen.176  They criticize 
libertarian notions of free will and retributivist views of punishment, and 
plump for a compatibilist view of free will and a consequentialist view of 
punishment.177  And they seem to think that these latter two views enable them 
to preserve a thin but nonetheless important notion of responsibility.178 
Both these views reject retributivist theories of punishment and instead 
endorse a consequentialist theory.179  In addition, both wish to preserve 
responsibility, on the grounds that some concept of responsibility is required 
by consequentialist theories of punishment.180  Civic life requires attributions 
of responsibility, according to Churchland, presumably because it is correct to 
say that persons with normal capacities of self-control are sometimes 
responsible for their actions.181  Greene & Cohen are more explicit.182  In their 
view, “we can say that the actions of rational people operating free from 
duress, etc. are free actions,” and, in consequence, that such persons can 
properly be held responsible.183 
If so—if Greene & Cohen and Churchland wish to preserve a thin notion 
of responsibility—we think they should reconsider.  Two points are relevant.  
First, consequentialist theories of punishment do not require any attributions of 
responsibility.  A nice example from Derk Pereboom makes this point: many 
believe that some cases of forced quarantine are justifiable on consequentialist 
grounds.184  Returning soldiers or health workers who might be carrying a 
communicable disease capable of triggering an epidemic may, with sufficient 
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justification, be deprived of their liberties for a circumscribed period of time.  
Even against their will.  This justification holds despite the fact that the 
persons forced into quarantine cannot be said to be responsible in any moral or 
legal sense for the fact that they might be carriers of a deadly agent.  If so, if 
the loss of liberties can be justified without the attribution of moral or legal 
responsibility, then, on our understanding of their views, neither Churchland 
nor Greene & Cohen have adequate grounds on which to preserve any notion 
of moral or legal responsibility. 
Our second point is that, on the view defended in this review, all 
compatibilist theories of free will and responsibility are difficult to square with 
the implications of the integration of Panksepp and Dehaene.  As we saw in 
Bok’s view, the heart of any compatibilist theory is the assumption that we are 
capable, in some range of conditions, of practical reason sufficient for moral 
responsibility.  Our integration of Panksepp and Dehaene calls this assumption 
into question.  If we are correct, then the attribution of responsibility to persons 
whose actions can be regulated with incentives may be no more apt than 
attributions to those whose actions must be regulated in some other way. 
D. Practical Reason from a Biological Point of View 
As suggested by Jones & Goldsmith in Chapter 4, if the law’s concept of 
the person is informed mainly by our folk psychological concepts, then it is 
profoundly incomplete and probably mistaken in substantive ways.185  What is 
missing is the biological point of view.  Indeed, insofar as we are products of 
evolutionary history, we should see ourselves and all our psychological 
capacities in precisely that light.  We should accept as our default position that 
there is no such thing as a psychological capacity that is not a biological 
capacity.  This, we surmise, is part of the paradigm shift suggested by Jones & 
Goldsmith’s claim that the law must be informed by the findings of behavioral 
biology.186 
It thus is no accident that, of all the authors represented in Chapter 5, the 
biologist’s view appears closest to ours.  Coyne asserts the non-existence of 
free will and moral responsibility, and although he endorses a system of 
rewards and punishments, he refrains from insisting that a consequentialist 
system of punishment somehow saves responsibility.187  Exactly so. 
Perhaps more than any other theorist represented in Chapter 5, Robert 
Sapolsky clearly endorses the Jones & Goldsmith behavioral biological 
model.188  Sapolsky describes neuroscientific evidence for two crucial claims.  
The first is that there are persons capable of knowing that a given action is 
illegal or otherwise wrong, but who suffer from an organic impairment in their 
capacity for volitional control.189  The second is that impairments in volitional 
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control fall on a continuum and may be pervasive across large swathes of the 
human population.190  You fall somewhere on this continuum, as do we.  If so, 
the doubts raised above concerning our capacities for practical rationality are 
confirmed.  In addition to our integration of Panksepp and Dehaene, it may be 
a pervasive fact that we are not the kind of organisms presupposed by our 
traditional views of responsibility.  It is thus difficult to overstate the 
importance of the biological point of view for properly assessing our folk 
psychological assumptions about ourselves. 
Indeed, Sapolsky’s claim that we can have knowledge that fails to 
connect to our affective and motivational capacities is an important extension 
of our integration of Panksepp and Dehaene.191  Sapolsky gives evidence that 
we often “know” things—believe them at the level of conscious awareness—in 
such a way that the relevant beliefs do not engage our affective capacities.192  
This provides yet another reason why the views of practical reason 
presupposed by Bok, Morse, and others fail to apply to organisms like us, at 
least for a range of conditions under which we must deliberate and act in our 
daily lives.  No doubt the view endorsed by Bok and Morse proceeds from the 
conceptual categories bequeathed to us by our cultural (mostly theological?) 
predecessors.  But it is not a view that will survive further neuroscientific 
inquiry. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We began this Essay with the suggestion that L&N signals, even 
encourages, a paradigm shift in the sense that Thomas Kuhn understood 
dramatic shifts in scientific inquiry proceed.  It is when the existing paradigm, 
or conventional thought, begins to fail that there is room, indeed, real need for, 
a new paradigm that can make sense of the anomalies that emerge under the 
old paradigm.  “Folk psychology,” and its relationship to the deontological 
basis of legal doctrine, is an old paradigm that has begun to show its age, and 
disutility, as anomalies emerge across the fundamental doctrinal categories: In 
tort law, the doctrine fails to recognize the fundamental affinity of physical and 
so-called “mental” or emotional harm,193 and pain remains a mystery for which 
the doctrine can only temperamentally account.194  Neuroscience reveals that 
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all injury is ultimately physical; all pain has a physical correlate and can only 
be appreciated and appraised in terms of brain states.195  The criminal law 
doctrine depends on conceptions of retribution that result in the generation of 
more crime and greater, unnecessary human suffering; the growing disquiet 
with mandatory sentencing signals the emergence of that anomaly.196  And 
even in contract law, where consent has done the normative heavy lifting for 
hundreds of years, cracks in the edifice are emerging: it just makes no sense to 
talk in terms of consent to “agreements” designed to discourage real 
understanding.197 
Even if Kuhn overstates the impact of paradigm shift in the history of 
science, new paradigms emerge when the discovery of anomalies in the 
accepted way of thinking begin to compromise the explanatory power of the 
accepted wisdom: 
Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with the 
recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced 
expectations that govern normal science.  It then continues with a 
more or less extended exploration of the area of anomaly.  And it 
closes only when the paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the 
anomalous has become the expected.  Assimilating a new sort of fact 
demands a more than additive adjustment of theory, and until that 
adjustment is completed—until the scientist has learned to see 
nature in a different way—the new fact is not quite a scientific fact 
at all.198 
And that is where the debate, the tension, is now: has neuroscience revealed a 
new “science” of law? 
While it is unusual to write an essay reviewing a law school course 
book,199 we believe that the significance of L&N and neuroscience for the 
study of law and its normative foundations (also often the focus of 
undergraduate and graduate philosophy courses) makes it important, even vital, 
that the law and philosophical academies take account of the challenge 
presented by this new paradigm.  L&N is not flawless: we have suggested 
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where future editions might focus and expand the inquiry, and we would each 
adjust and perhaps supplement the materials to better meet pedagogical goals 
in the courses we teach.  But L&N is more than a tentative beginning: it marks 
a sea change, a demonstration that a paradigm shift is underway.  We must 
take account. 
